INTRODUCTION

THERE WAS NOTHING SURPRISING ABOUT THE RESULT IN Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,' the latest decision of the United States Supreme Court dealing with securities fraud under Rule lOb-5. 2 The holding in 4 But the Court clearly stated that to be held liable, the secondary defendant itself must have violated Rule 10b- 5V In essence, the question in Stoneridge was what constitutes participation in securities fraud. Rule 10b-5 outlaws any "device, scheme, or artifice" to commit fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 6 The Central Bank Court had not considered the possibility that the word "scheme" may be read to extend liability to anyone who contributes to a scheme to defraud. In other words, the plaintiffs in Stoneridge sought to impose liability for something like civil conspiracy to all participants in the scheme. ' The defendant argued that to be liable under Rule 10b- 5, a plaintiff must satisfy all the elements of the rule personally To be specific, a plaintiff must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant, (2) scienter, (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission, (5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation. 9 In particular, the defendant argued that it had made no deceptive statement as required under the rule.'°I .
THE FACTUAL SETTING
In Central Bank, the defendant (Central Bank) served as indenture trustee for bonds issued by the Colorado Public Building Authority (PBA) in 1986 to finance a real estate development by the developer AmWest." The bonds were secured by land, and the indenture required that the value of the land be at least 160% of the outstanding principal and interest on the bonds. 2 AmWest was required under the indenture to submit annual reports to the indenture trustee. In 1988, AmWest submitted a report showing no change in value. 3 The underwriter of the bond issue expressed doubts about the report because land values had been falling in the area. 4 Central Bank concluded that the report was too optimistic and that a new independent appraisal of the property was necessary.' But, at the behest of AmWest and the PBA, Central Bank agreed to delay a new appraisal until after a new issue of bonds under the indenture. 6 In the end, the issuer defaulted, 7 and the bond investors sued under Rule 10b-5, claiming that Central Bank had aided and abetted the fraud.' The Court ultimately disagreed, holding that nothing in the tortious means to accomplish an act not in itself illegal; and 3) [alctual legal damage resulting to the plaintiff") (internal quotations omitted). In Ford, the court found that a vicarious liability claim could not be made because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the state owed a duty to him. 814 A.2d at 140-41. In Lloyd, the respondents took part in a conspiracy because they agreed to coordinate their activities so as to stifle competition within the automotive market. 916 A.2d at 285. Although the Stoneridge Court does not discuss it, it seems likely that most instances of fraud under Rule lob-5 involve actors who satisfy only one or two of the required elements. 
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statute supported aiding and abetting liability and that a secondary actor must be an actual participant in the fraud in order to be held liable. 9 In Stoneridge, the primary violator was Charter Communications, a struggling cable television provider. 2 " In order to beef up reported advertising revenue, Charter bought converter boxes at inflated prices from Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, who in turn agreed to spend the excess on advertising to be broadcast over the Charter cable system. 2 ' Investors who bought Charter stock during the fraud period filed a class action. 22 But Charter was deeply in debt and nearly broke, 23 so in the hope of collecting from someone, the plaintiffs also sued Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola on the theory that they had participated in the scheme because they knew (or were at least reckless in not knowing) that the purpose of the scheme was to permit Charter to report inflated advertising revenues. 02-CV-1186 CAS) ("Charter is a significantly debt ridden company, has very little in the way of current earnings, has some cash flow, but nonetheless at the end of the day we would have been hard pressed to actually collect from this company rather than throwing it into bankruptcy."); see also In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. MDL 1506; 4:02-CV-1186 CAS, 2004 WL 3826761, at *3-4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2004) (noting that the sham transactions were entered into even though they would have had "no legitimate effect on Charter's operating cash flow").
24. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766-67.
VOL. 27 But the Court chose to focus its attention elsewhere-on the reliance requirement. 28 This is not to say that the Court failed to note the implications of PSLRA. 29 It is only to say that the Court relegated PSLRA to one of several factors bearing on statutory interpretation.
3°R
ather than hang his hat on the convenient hook of congressional intent, Justice Kennedy (who also authored the Central Bank opinion) reasoned that the plaintiffs in Stoneridge failed to show reliance by Charter investors on any statement by the secondary defendants. 3 ' The defendants had argued that because they did not speak to the market, they could not be held to have misled the market.
2 Fraud requires deception. 33 Here the secondary defendants agreed to the scheme cooked up by
Charter. 4 But they certainly did not deceive Charter in doing so, since Charter allegedly requested their participation.
3
" Justice Kennedy was quick to point out that conduct can be deceiving. 6 One need not speak to deceive.
37
This seems clearly to be correct. How else could insider trading be illegal? It is a fraud that depends on stealth. 38 To be sure, insider trading also requires that the defendant have some sort of duty to the source of the information not to use the information for personal gain or at least not to do so without disclosing the intent to do so to the source of the information. 39 In a phrase: disclose or abstain. 4 
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But it is the duty that comes first. Disclosure is just one way to satisfy the duty.
4'
Given the need to preserve conduct as fraud, it seems quite natural that Justice Kennedy would focus instead on reliance. 42 As he notes, the Stoneridge plaintiffs did not rely on any statement by the secondary defendants.
3 More important, there was no automatic presumption of reliance." The secondary defendants had no duty to speak that would trigger a presumption of reliance on an omission.
4
" They made no statement to the market that would trigger the presumption on the integrity of the market under the fraud-on-the-market theory. 46 Having found no reliance or presumption thereof, the Court addresses the argument that the secondary defendants participated in the scheme cooked up by Charter upon which the plaintiffs clearly did rely. 7 The Court explains that this argument does not answer the objection that the plaintiffs did not rely on the deceptive conduct of the secondary defendants.
8 Sensing perhaps that this begs the question, the Court holds that the actions of the secondary defendants were too remote to be the subject of a private cause of action. 49 So it is far from clear that Stoneridge changes much of anything except to foreclose the possibility that the word "scheme" has some special significance.
III. WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
Some scholars argue that the effect of Stoneridge is to limit the scope of the private right of action under Rule 10b-5 without limiting the scope of the rule as it might be used by the SEC or Department of Justice (DOJ). 55 The government need not prove reliance in the same way that a private litigant must, 56 because the government does not need to prove damages.
5 7 Thus, it is arguable that Stoneridge is about who may sue and be sued in a private civil action.
8 It is about something like standing (though obviously that concept does not fit well for defendants). 9 In short, Stoneridge is just another example of the ongoing effort of the Supreme Court to confine the scope of Rule 10b-5 at least insofar as it may be used by private litigants. 6° The problem is that there have been notable decisions that also limit the reach of the government. 6 ' So why did the Court not focus more on PSLRA than on the common law elements of fraud? Congress itself had already fashioned a distinction between public and private actions under Rule 10b-5. 62 Moreover, the SEC and the DOJ cannot completely ignore the reliance element of a fraud claim under Rule 10b-5. 63 The government must prove materiality. 64 And materiality implies reliance in omission cases. 65 So if the goal is to limit private actions without affecting public actions, Stoneridge does not accomplish much. 
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There is another possible interpretation of Stoneridge that is much more far reaching. It seems clear that Stoneridge is really about causation-in this case transaction causation. 66 It is not likely a coincidence that another recent Supreme Court decision, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, was also about causation-in that case damages causation. 67 Moreover, as noted above, Stoneridge is a case that could easily have been decided on other grounds.
6
" And Dura Pharmaceuticals is a case that the Court did not really need to take. 69 Thus, it appears that the Court is particularly interested in causation.
"
It is unfortunate that the Court chose to focus on causation and the notoriously vague notion of proximate cause. As a result, the Court was more or less forced into a lame discussion of policy considerations, such as the possibility that the extension of liability to such schemes might drive foreign business away from US capital markets.
7
' It would have been much better if the Court had focused instead on making sense out of U.S. securities regulation.
For those of us who oppose securities fraud class actions ("SFCAs"), this suggests an opportunity-if not an invitation from the Court-to argue for a fundamental change. 72 To be specific, the Court may well be receptive to the argument that, in cases such as Stoneridge, there is no fraud because there is no damage. Let me explain.
66. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776. 67. 544 U.S. at 346. 68. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 69. Dura Pharmaceuticals concerned whether an investor pleading securities fraud could satisfy the loss causation requirement by alleging that the stock's price on the date of purchase was inflated due to misrepresentation. 544 U.S. at 338. The Court held that in order to state a cause of action, there must be a causal connection between the information withheld and stock price. Id. at 346. In other words, the information must be material in the sense that it matters to the market enough to affect stock price. See id. at 344-45. The problem is that the plaintiffs can always argue that the information became known to some in the market before the official disclosure. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth 
BAD SECURITIES LITIGATION
Stoneridge is a classic stock-drop class action." The plaintiffs bought outstanding Charter stock in the open market at a time when the price was allegedly too high because the market had been given false information about Charter's finances. 74 It is not a case alleging that Charter itself had fraudulently sold stock to the public at an inflated price.
7
" In other words, it is not a case in which Charter obtained money by a fraudulent public offering and should be made to give it back. 76 In a stockdrop case-as in musical chairs-someone is going to suffer the loss one way or the other. 77 The so-called fraud is nothing more than a delay of the inevitable.
7 " The loss suffered by those who buy during the fraud period-the period before the truth comes out-is nothing more than bad luck in buying at the wrong time. 
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
The bad luck of buyers is offset-dollar for dollar-by the good luck of investors who happen to sell at the right time."° In other words, securities fraud in the context of a stock drop action is a zero-sum game.
8 '
A stock-drop action under Rule 10b-5 usually arises from the failure of a publicly traded company to disclose material information in a timely fashion.
2 The disclosed information may be either good or bad news. 3 In other words, an action may be triggered by news that causes the price of a stock to rise (in which case those who sold during the fraud period suffer harm) or by news that causes the price of a stock to fall (in which case those who bought during the fraud period unlucky in the sense that they do not know that the shares they purchase or sell have either inflated or deflated prices).
80. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 10 (discussing how investor gains and losses offset each other, as for every investor who suffers a loss due to purchasing a share, there is an investor that gains due to the sale of a share 6 Thus, the discussion here is based on the premise that securities fraud involves the failure to disclose bad news in a timely way.
In a bad news case, the plaintiff class consists of all who purchased the stock in question during the fraud period and continue to hold it until corrective disclosure. 87 The standard approach to damages in a bad news case is to award the difference between the price paid by the buyer and the market price after corrective disclosure. 8 And it is the company (or its insurance company) that pays the award.
9
Although some investors may recover substantial sums in a class action, most investors lose from such actions. Booth, Missing Link] . Indeed, it is fair to say that it is irrational for most investors not to diversify. Booth, Taking Certification Seriously, supra note 81, at 22. By investing in a well diversified portfolio of stocks, an investor can eliminate company-specific risk without any sacrifice of return. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 7. For every company that underperforms, another will overperform. See id. Only the average matters. If it is possible to eliminate risk without any sacrifice of return, a rational investor will do so. Id. Accordingly, a rational investor diversifies. Id. Although it may go without saying, the focus here is on passive investors. The logic of diversification does not necessarily apply to an investor who seeks to exert control over a company or to pursue other idiosyncratic strategies. 
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investor is equally likely to sell or buy an overpriced stock. 92 For such investors, gains and losses wash out over time. 93 In other words, a diversified investor is likely to gain from the timely sale of an overpriced stock about as often as she loses from the untimely purchase of an overpriced stock. 94 But the investor who innocently sells an overpriced stock need not disgorge her (effective) gain, and over time, such gains make up for losses. 95 In other words, a diversified investor is effectively insured against securities fraud by virtue of being diversified. 96 Thus, diversified investors are net losers to the extent of attorney fees and other costs of litigation, including such intangibles as management distraction. 97 These costs without beneequity fund is more than large enough to pursue a strategy of low-cost, passive diversification") (footnote omitted). By shedding some of the risk that they would otherwise be forced to bear, these firms may grow even larger in the future. L.J 178 (2007) ("Diversification can be thought of as an investment strategy that 'slices' a portfolio across different asset and sub-asset classes."). But the discussion here is focused solely on stock investors, because executive compensation is ultimately an issue of fiduciary duty and fiduciary duty normally runs only to stockholders. Moreover, diversification carries somewhat different implications for other asset classes. For example, although it makes perfect sense to diversify a portfolio of bonds in order to reduce the risk of default, bonds do not offer any significant company-specific upside potential, whereas with stocks, those that perform above expectation make up for those that perform below expectation.
92. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 3.
93
. See Anjan V. Thakor, The Economic Reality of Securities Class Action Litigation 6 (U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform Oct. 2005). The Thakor study included 2,596 large institutional investors who traded in 476 securities that were the subject of class action settlements between December 22, 1995 and August 25, 2005 and found (based on modest assumptions about the timing of trades during fund reporting periods) that the institutions suffered losses of $43.8 billion and gains of $30.7 billion in the affected securities for a net loss of $13.1 billion before settlement. Id. at 8 Exhibit A. Interestingly, the institutions' share of settlement proceeds in these cases was $11.9 billion (less $1.7 billion in attorney fees) for a net loss before attorney fees of just $1.2 billion. Id. The study also found evidence that the pre-settlement losses were attributable to new issues of securities during the fraud period. Id. at 15. Specifically, $1.5 billion in loss was attributable to IPOs and $10.6 billion in loss was attributable to the half of the non IPO cases involving issuers who were relative net sellers of stock. Id. at 8 Exhibit A. Just $1 billion in loss was attributable to the half of cases involving companies classified as non-issuers. Id. (It is unclear why the study divided the remaining cases in half rather than according to whether the issuer was in fact a net seller or net buyer during the class period. " For a diversified investor, it is the equivalent of paying for two insurance policies against the same risk. 99 This would be quite apparent-and quite controversial-if the law required sellers to give up their gains to reimburse buyers.
Diversified investors should oppose SFCAs for this reason alone. But diversified investors lose even more from SFCAs in cases in which they neither buy nor sell the subject stock-in cases in which they are mere holders of the subject stock."°' To be specific, the prospect of payout by the defendant company causes its stock price to fall even more than it would because of the disclosure of new negative information.' Stock price goes down by some amount that reflects the bad news and by some additional amount that reflects the likely settlement with buyer-plaintiffs.' 2 That, in turn, increases the potential damages payable by the subject company, causing a further decrease in price."
3 And so on. 7 , 12 (1994) ("One is hard put to identify specific adverse events.., that could account for the panic selling that wiped out one quarter of the total value of American stocks. Economists' inability to explain the 1987 crash by specific changes in fundamentals posed a daunting challenge, particularly to those who believe capital markets are efficient and investors rational.") (footnote omitted). But a perfectly efficient market will overreact to bad news-as a result of feedback-if it appears likely that the company will become the target of securities fraud litigation as a result. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 8. This is not the usual pie-in-the-sky argument that the market knows all. Rather the point is that even if the market is perfectly efficient it will overreact to bad news that is likely to give rise to a securities fraud class action in the
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positive feedback mechanism that has the effect of magnifying the potential payout. 5 The effect on a target company can be devastating." 6 sense that the market price of the subject stock will fall by more than it should in light of the bad news. Id. In the real world, the market may fall even further as a result of true (inefficient) may think of insurance as an off balance sheet asset that supports stock price. Second, insurance is likely to become more expensive for the settling company in the future (as well as for other companies). See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 8 n.14. Thus, the company will have higher insurance expenses in the future, returns will be lower in the future, and stock price will adjust downward accordingly. See generally id. So feedback sneaks back into the picture one way or the other. On the other hand, feedback will arise only to the extent that the market thinks the company will pay. Id. at 3. If it is true that issuers and plaintiff lawyers generally agree to settle for an amount that will be covered by insurance, presumably the market will react accordingly. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1421, 1427 (1994) (arguing that stock price drops following the disclosure of bad news result from three factors: "(1) the market value of the new information itself; (2) the anticipated costs of litigation over the disclosure; and (3) the value of the termination of subsequent purchasers' right to sue over the information.") (emphasis added). In other words, market price will not necessarily fall by an amount that reflects the full amount of damages that might be awarded, if the market thinks that the case will be settled for some lesser amount. Cf. id. at 8.
105.
The extent of feedback ultimately depends on the number of shares represented by the plaintiff class. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 8. For example, if the holdings of the plaintiff class are equal to 50% of the outstanding shares, the decrease in the price of the subject stock will be twice what it would have been in the absence of a class action. See generally id. The following formula expresses the relationship: total decrease in market value = expected decrease / (1 -% of shares damaged) For example, if the expected decrease in firm value based solely on the revelation of bad news (without feedback) is 10% and the plaintiff class-those who bought during the fraud period-represent 40% of the shares, the total decrease in the value of the shares will be about 17%: total decrease in market value = .10 / (I -.40) = .10 / .60 = .166
If the plaintiff class represents 50% of the shares, the total decrease in value will be 20%-twice the decrease that would be seen if there were no threat of a SFCA. And if the plaintiff class represents 80% of the shares, the total decrease in value will be 50%-five times what it would have been if there were no threat of a SFCA. In other words, the company will be worth half what it would have been worth in such a case even though the bad news was that its value had fallen by 10%.
106. The Paulson Report notes that the chances are about 10% that any given company will become the target of securities litigation in any five year period. PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 74. This is a roundabout way of saying that there are about 10,000 listed companies and about 200 SFCAs filed each year. In other words, two in every hundred companies are likely to get sued in any given year. But the report fails to connect the dots. If a diversified investor holds 500 different stocks through a mutual fund, ten stocks are likely to be the target of a securities fraud action each year. If the mutual fund has an annual turnover ratio of 40%-about the market average-then on the average it will be a buyer in two cases, a seller in two cases, and a holder in six VOL. 4 NO. 1 2009 A diversified investor is likely to be a non-trading holder of many stocks that become the target of SFCAs.' 1 7 In such cases, non-trading holders effectively reimburse buyers because the issuer pays the settlement.' 5 Thus, although diversified investors break even as traders, they lose as holders.°9 Accordingly, a diversified investor is not merely indifferent to securities fraud litigation."' A diversified investor should be positively opposed to the system as it stands."' cases. The fund and its investors will break even on the 40% of the portfolio that trades during the year, but it will lose on the 60% that is held. Although the Paulson Report correctly states that holders lose because the company pays, this bland statement hardly captures the situation. Id. at 79. Holders see their stock fall in price by more than it should. And perhaps more important, the defendant company sees its market capitalizationits aggregate value-fall by more than it should. Going forward, the company faces a higher cost of capital than it should-if it survives. About 30% of defendant companies end up bankrupt or are removed from their respective exchange. See LAURA E. SIMMONS In that case, the class period was more than three years long, suggesting that almost all of the stockholders would be members of the plaintiff class. Id. at 397-98. To be sure, many of the plaintiffs in the WorldCom litigation acquired their shares from WorldCom itself as the company grew by taking over other smaller companies in stock for stock deals. Id. Such plaintiffs had legitimate 1933 Act claims against the company. Id. at 399, 416 n.12. But the irony remains that in the case of both Enron and WorldCom, the plaintiffs would have been much better off if no SFCA had been filed. See Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1585 (stating that contemporary securities litigation "benefits three sets of actors-corporate insiders, plaintiffs' attorneys, and insurance companies-but not shareholders"); but see id. at 1555 (noting that while shareholders in general do not benefit from securities litigation, the Enron and WorldCom settlements were the largest in U.S. history, making shareholders of those companies relatively better off as a result of the litigation than shareholders of other companies).
107. If an investor holds shares in the defendant company and buys more during the fraud period, he may lose as much on the shares he holds as he recovers on the shares he bought. Id. For this insight, the Report cites Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72. As I argue elsewhere, holder-buyers who stand to lose more than they gain from a class action would oppose certification of the action if they could vote on the matter. See Booth, Taking Certification Seriously, supra note 81, at 19 n.50. Thus, there is an inherent conflict of interest within the plaintiff class that should preclude class certification. Id. at 22. It is no answer that holder-buyers may opt out of the action. Id. at 16. If the action proceeds as a class action, they must remain in the plaintiff class to obtain their share of any recovery. Id. In other words, there is a kind of market failure at work here. See generally Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611 (1995) (comparing the market failure of zero-sum stock market investing with the market failure resulting from holder-buyers joining a plaintiff class with interests that are contrary to the investment goals of the holder-buyer). It is thus up to the courts to remedy the situation by declining to certify the action as a class action. See Booth, Taking Certification
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Indeed, the Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (the Paulson Report) finds that the public value of securities class action litigation is questionable because (1) the costs fall on the corporation and thus its stockholders (even though the company gained nothing from the fraud), (2) settlements account for a very small percentage of total investor losses, and (3) the settlement is effectively paid by investors who held shares at the time of the fraud to investors who bought during the fraud period.' 12 This litany of problems is really three ways of saying the same thing: SFCAs suffer from circularity." 3 V.
GOOD 120. This seems quite obvious in a case of reputational harm. It would hardly make sense to make the corporation pay because it was harmed by one of its agents. See Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1585; Langevoort, supra note 79, at 632-33. Yet that is essentially the system we have with stock-drop actions. Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1585. It also seems clear that in a case of options backdating, the optionee should give back the ill-gotten options. That remedy addresses the harm to other stockholders-dilution-quite directly. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 31. Insider trading has always been a bit confusing on this score because it is not really clear why insider trading is illegal. See id. at 30. But the misappropriation theory seems now to be well settled. 126. Anabtawi, supra note 125, at 861 (describing how the court in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. "decided that a corporate insider must abstain from trading in the shares of her corporation unless she has first disclosed all material inside information" due to the fiduciary duty that an insider owes to the corporation). The Paulson Report notes that individual defendants rarely pay any part of the settlement in a SFCA except in cases in which the company is insolvent and has tapped out its insurance. PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 78-79. But the Report stops short of suggesting that individuals should pay more (though it does endorse individual liability where appropriate). See generally id. This is not too surprising in that the Report finds that securities fraud litigation confers no benefits on investors. See generally id. (discussing data that illustrates how security class actions do not do a good job of compensating injured investors, if at all). Rather, the Report suggests a series of clarifications in the law defining securities fraud and proposes that corporations and their stockholders should be free to choose alternative dispute resolution methods. See id. at 80-81, 109-10. Specifically, the Report recommends that the SEC and the courts should clarify the meaning of materiality, scienter, and reliance. Id. at 12. In addition, the SEC should use its powers to prevent duplicative recovery in cases where there is both private litigation and a SEC enforcement action. See id. at 12-13. And plaintiff lawyers should be prohibited from engaging in practices that amount to paying clients to serve as plaintiffs. See id. at 82-83. The Report also addresses the overuse of criminal sanctions and the dangers of imposing excessive liability on auditors and outside directors. See id. at 84-91. The executive summary emphasizes the need for continued enforcement against individual wrongdoers. Id. at 11. But curiously, there is almost nothing to that end in the discussion of SFCAs. See generally id. Rather, the Report ultimately-and rather cryptically-recommends that corporations and their stockholders should be free to choose alternative dispute resolution methods. Id. at 109-12. This might be read as something of an endorsement for derivative actions. Neither of these recommendations addresses the real problem. In essence, the recommendation is that we should be more efficient about handling pointless litigation. See generally id.
127. See generally Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 24. 128. As a practical matter, a court could so rule in a motion to certify on the rationale that conflicts within the plaintiff class render an action for individual damages inappropriate for class action treatment under Rule 9 The fact that the parties style the action as a direct (class) action rather than as a derivative action does not make it so.
3 ' The real harm from securities fraud (if any) comes from the misappropriation of stockholder wealth by insiders. " ' Redistribution of inevitable losses among innocent investors is regrettable, but stockholders can easily protect themselves from that sort of harm through diversification.' To be sure, in the absence of insider gain, the action will likely be dismissed. ' 134. In addition, a derivative action is subject to procedural complications (such as the demand requirement and the possibility that the corporation may seek voluntary dismissal) that may make it less desirable than a direct action. Eric Talley, Taking the "I" Out of "Team": Intra-Firm Monitoring and the Content of Fiduciary Duties, 24 J. CORP. L. 1001, 1008 (1999) (discussing the procedural obstacles at play when bringing a derivative action). Moreover, the settlement of a derivative action based on misappropriation or other gain to the wrongdoer likely will not be covered by insurance. A.C. Pritchard 
gains, investors suffer a genuine loss. 3 In such cases, a diversified investor would prefer to have the issuer recover the ill-gotten gains by means of a derivative action or a direct action by the issuer.' 39 But there is no situation in which a diversified investor would favor a system of securities regulation that includes SFCAs as we know them.' 4° To be sure, an undiversified investor might favor a class action remedy. " ' An undiversified investor may suffer real harm from securities fraud. 42 An investor who forgoes the benefits of diversification and picks a single stock can lose her entire investment.' 43 For such an investor, the benefits of SFCAs may outweigh the costs.' 44 On the other hand, it is not clear that even undiversified investors should favor the existing system that causes stock price to fall more than it otherwise would. From an ex ante perspective such an investor is more likely to be a holder than to be a buyer and is thus more likely to lose as a result of feedback than to gain from being a member of the plaintiff class. 4 So why should the courts change this well-settled-even if confused and contradictory-system of private securities litigation that has evolved over the past forty or so years? The answer is that federal securities law is intended to protect reasonable investors.' 46 Most investors are well diversified. " 7 And it is arguable that it is irrational for most investors not to diversify. 4 Accordingly, federal securities law should be interpreted consistent with the interests of diversified investors."' One might ask how we ended up with the confused and contradictory system that we now have. The short answer is that under the 1933 Act investors who buy newly issued stock have an express cause of action against the issuer if there is any material falsehood in the registration statement or the prospectus. 15 U.S.C. § § 77k-(2006). But the 1933 Act also provides that the issuer cannot be held liable for any more than the proceeds of the offering. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). As a result, the courts have ruled that only those investors who buy stock that is part of the offering may recover. If the issuer is already publicly traded-if the offering is one of additional stock-it is likely that other "investors 
THE FUTURE OF SECURITIES LITIGATION
VI.
WHAT ABOUT DETERRENCE?
Some commentators have argued that although SFCAs do little good for investors, they are the most important source of deterrence we have. 5° Although the threat of a stock-drop action constitutes wildly excessive deterrence aimed at the wrong target, eliminating corporate liability would so reduce the incentives to sue that we would lose the deterrent effect of private litigation.' As John Coffee has stated, "one cannot safely eliminate corporate liability ... without radically reducing the likelihood of private enforcement."' 5 This is a peculiar argument. If there is so little at stake that the plaintiff bar will find it uneconomic to sue, so be it.' Moreover, if diversified investors are effectively insured-by virtue of being diversified-against the possibility that they may buy at the wrong time, what exactly do we want to deter? The only real worry for a diversified investor is that insiders may take advantage of nonpublic information in some way to misappropriate stockholder wealth from the market. 4 But there is little danger of underdeterrence here. There is plenty of motivation for plaintiff lawyers to file derivative actions."' Who would not be motivated by the prospect of a fee equal to (say) one-third of the $800 million misappropriated by the officers of Enron?" 6 Besides, one of the major problems with SFCAs is that the potential dam- Some have suggested a system of civil fines that limit the amount payable by the corporation.
6 ' The problem with civil fines-as with criminal prosecution-is that they are not particularly scalable.' 6 ' Fines-and criminal prosecution-are pretty much one size fits all.' 62 And they fit no one particularly well.
The Paulson Report suggests that SEC fines be used to compensate investor victims and that private awards be reduced by such amounts.' 63 But that fix does not address the feedback problem. The market does not care where the money goes or the route it takes when the company pays. As long as the issuer remains on the hook for investor losses, feedback will magnify the loss. 164 Others have suggested that issuers be exempt from liability under Rule 10b-5 in cases in which the issuer itself does not sell stock. 6 To be sure, that fix would leave decrease in the market price of the subject company, it is impossible to know how much real damage has been done. Robert B. 175. Civil fines and criminal prosecution are blunt instruments. The penalty is more or less all or nothing. See Booth, Business Crime, supra note 81, at 139. In contrast, in a civil action, the plaintiff must plead and prove damages. Id. Thus, with civil liability you know who lost what and who recovers. In addition, a private plaintiff must weigh the costs and benefits of filing a civil action. Id. In other words, civil remedies are both self-executing and self-regulating. Id. As Gordon Gekko might have said, the need to quantify the stakes clears the mind and focuses the will. Id. at 139 n.76. In contrast, neither a regulator nor a prosecutor must prove damages. See id. at 139. And neither has much of any reason not to prosecute an offense other than the prospect of losing. Id. On the other hand, simple compensatory damages may be insufficient deterrence. 
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Issuer recovery is also consistent with the findings and recommendations in the Paulson Report.' 76 Indeed it is somewhat surprising that the Report fails to connect the dots and propose a similar solution.' 77 For example, the Report suggests that enforcement should focus more on individual wrongdoers. 7 The Report also expresses general concern about the overuse of criminal sanctions.'
79 In addition, the Report suggests that recent revelations of lawyers bribing plaintiffs indicates that in many cases plaintiffs are not otherwise inclined to sue because they have not suffered any real loss (or would lose as much as holders as they gain as members of the plaintiff class).' Finally, the Report also recommends that the SEC clarify the meaning of scienter.'' Although PSLRA stiffened pleading standards by requiring facts indicating a strong inference of scienter, we seem to have lost track of the fact that scienter means intent to defraud-intent to (mis)appropriate the wealth of another by deception.112 However reprehensible it is for a company to lie to the market in the hope that bad news might be covered up, it is not fraud, and there is no scienter, unless someone gains in the bargain. 11 (2008) . Although the point is that the accounting profession remains exposed to litigation, the (unintended) suggestion is that many actions are based on illusory losses. See Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1550. Similarly, the report also suggests that the SEC should provide more guidance about what constitutes materiality and reliance. PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 80. In both cases, the thrust seems to be to assure that the actions that are litigated are the ones in which there has been genuine economic loss.
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Arguably, the Stoneridge Court should have considered whether the conduct of the secondary defendants satisfied the scienter requirement."
4 There is little doubt that the secondary defendants knew that Charter had asked them to overpay for set top boxes.' 5 But it is not at all clear that they knew or even suspected that Charter would mislead its own investors."' There are other possible explanations."7
The courts seem to have forgotten that scienter is more than some kind of knowledge that a statement is false.' Rather scienter means intent to defraud. 9 And intent to defraud connotes that the perpetrator seeks somehow to gain something of value by means of deception.
9 So what was the gain for the Stoneridge defendants? Arguably, they got some free advertising time from Charter.
9 ' Even if they had no use for the time, they could presumably sell it.' But it was a product that no one much wanted, which was why Charter was giving it away in the first 184. To be sure, this question was not before the Court. But arguably neither was the question of reliance. See generally Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008) (explaining that the rebuttable presumption of reliance present under the fraud-on-the-market theory or when "there is an omission of a material fact by one with a duty to disclose" did not apply in Stoneridge). One must wonder whether the Court is free to choose the issues that it does and does not address in the cases that it chooses to decide.
185. See id. at 767. 186. See id. at 766-67. 187. One possibility is that the secondary defendants would have used the free advertising and drawn others to actually buy advertising. Id. at 766. Incidentally, the scheme seems like one that might have been cooked up by middle managers without the consent of higher ups. See generally id. at 767 (noting that the involved "companies drafted documents to make it appear the transactions were unrelated and conducted in the ordinary course of business").
188. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (defining "scienter" as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud").
189. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2506-12 (2007) (setting out the requirements for scienter); Booth, Business Crime, supra note 81, at 130. I am not a fan of resorting to the dictionary. Often as not, dictionary definitions seem to be used as some kind of judicial ice-breaker to begin the analysis in a vacuum.
190. United States v. Chenaur, 552 F.2d 294, 299 n.7 (1997) ("To act with 'intent to defraud' means to act knowingly, and with the specific intent to deceive; ordinarily for the purpose of either causing some financial loss to another or bringing about some financial gain to oneself."). To be sure, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 526 defines scienter solely in terms of intent:
The word 'fraudulent' is here used as referring solely to the maker's knowledge of the untrue character of his representation. This element of the defendant's conduct frequently is called 'scienter' by the courts. Intent and expectation of influencing the other's conduct by the misrepresentation are dealt with in § § 531-536 as a separate and distinct element necessary to liability under the rule stated in § 525.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 cmt. a (2006).
On the other hand, the cases cited by the Restatement invariably involve some sort of gain to the perpetrator. See, e.g., Tenneco Oil Co. v. Joiner, 696 F.2d 768, 770 (1982) (where an oil company sued its landman for fraud because he obtained funds above and beyond his salary and expenses). Moreover, the Court has emphasized that federal securities law is different from common law fraud. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 771 (responding to the argument that the reliance element would have been satisfied if this were a common law fraud action by observing that "Section 10(b) does not incorporate common-law fraud into federal law"); see also Indeed, it might have been some kind of breach of fiduciary duty not to take it.'
Ironically, the federal courts have struck such a distinction in insider trading cases arising under Rule 10b-5.' 96 For example, in Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court declined to find insider trading in a case in which a whistle-blower conveyed material nonpublic information to an analyst who used the information to recommend that his clients sell. the subject stock.' 97 The court reasoned that because the whistleblower did not seek economic gain from the use of the information, it did not constitute an illegal stock tip.
9 ' Subsequently, in United States v. O'Hagan, the Supreme Court, in upholding the misappropriation theory of insider trading, held that "a fiduciary who [pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal's information for personal gain, dupes or defrauds the principal."'
99
The Stoneridge Court expressly distinguished Dirks because the tipper there sought no personal gain."° To be sure, the Stoneridge defendants owed no fiduciary duty to Charter stockholders.
21
' But the point is that even in a situation in which the defendant is a fiduciary, personal gain is required under federal securities law.
20 2 The rule could be otherwise.
20 3 A breach of confidence without gain could be enough. 0 4 But the Court wisely requires gain.
2 " The rule should be the same in a stock-drop case. The obvious argument against issuer recovery is that no corporation will go after its own and that the corporation will likely do all it can to thwart any derivative action. That is undoubtedly true in a world with SFCAs.
2°6 It is only natural that a company accused of fraud will circle the wagons."
7 And no company would dare initiate an action against its own officers for fear that it would trigger a ruinous class action.
"
8 Indeed, as the law currently works, it may even be rational to cover up bad news that is likely to give rise to a class action."
9 If the news is bad enough that a class action would likely bankrupt the company, there may be nothing to lose from a cover up.
2 "' Thus, it is arguable that SFCAs constitute a significant obstacle to effective corporate governance."' That may explain at least in part the recent growth in the criminal prosecution of such controversies."' There is no reason to assume that a corporation will respond in the same way in the absence of the class action threat." 3 In the current environment, one can hardly fault an outside director who concludes that it is contrary to the best interests of the corporation to pursue an action against a CEO. 214 In the absence of the class action threat, however, outside directors would themselves be subject to potential legal action for failure to seek restitution when appropriate. As things stand, outside directors are practically immune to legal action. Nevertheless, the question remains: What is to keep the company honest if it is not liable for misleading the market? In the absence of insider gain, there would seem to be no reason for a company not to lie to the market. There are at least two good answers.
First, companies act only through individuals who may be liable for any gain they enjoy or facilitate for others and for any loss they cause by harming the repu- 206 . See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 33-34 (arguing that many companies may be deterred from pursuing claims against their own agents because of the in terrorem effect of SFCAs). If a company were to pursue its own officers, shareholders may be encouraged to bring a SFCA suit. Id. Settling a SFCA is prohibitively costly because not only are the plaintiffs paid, but also the value of the stock also goes down. Id. Therefore, to avoid the consequences of SFCAs, companies would logically avoid pursuing their own agents and attempt to quash any derivative suits. ' Under current law, individuals are (practically speaking) immune because the company's insurance pays.
2 ' To be sure, non-trading insiders may be protected by the business judgment rule because issuer recovery is essentially a matter of state law.
2 "' But the business judgment rule may not protect a non-trading insider from liability if there is a violation of SEC rules. 219 Moreover, the SEC always has the authority to file a civil enforcement action in any such case and may presumably join a private action where appropriate. 22 Second, given that equity is the primary form of compensation for most CEOs and other high level officers, insiders should have every incentive to assure that the market is fully informed.
22 " ' Where equity compensation is the norm, no company can afford to be blacked out of the market. 22 Companies need to issue stock and options and to buy back stock to control for dilution. 223 And officers who exercise options need to sell stock for tax planning and diversification. 224 In other words, insiders themselves have every reason to keep their companies honest. 225 Obviously, equity compensation did not prevent the most recent spate of frauds. Indeed, some have argued that equity compensation was ultimately to blame. 26 But the incentives would be quite different if issuer recovery were the rule. Admittedly, issuer recovery puts the board of directors in a peculiar position.
233
In effect, the board becomes an arbiter for the competing claims of officers and stockholders.' In some cases, the board may pursue claims against officers, while in other cases, the board may conclude that it is not in the best interest of the corporation to do so."' But that is a good thing. Again, for a diversified investor, the only real worry is insider misappropriation. 236 Everything else comes out in the wash. But it is not always clear what constitutes misappropriation. 237 For example, although it seems quite clear that backdating options is usually inappropriate, it is not so clear that granting options at a time when the stock is trading at a low is problematic.
238 Such decisions are judgment calls. 239 The board of directors is well suited to striking the required balance between stockholder expectations and executive compensation.
24° Moreover, to view the board of directors as an arbiter is consistent with the Paulson Report proposal that the SEC should explore the possibility of permitting companies to opt out of class actions and into alternative dispute 
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resolution."' That seems like an odd idea if one thinks of stockholders and the corporation as adversaries. 242 If that is the model, why should one party to a potential dispute (the corporation) be permitted to dictate terms to the other (the stockholders)? But if one thinks of the typical dispute as one between stockholders and officers about how to share the corporate wealth, it is easy to see how the board of directors might officiate. 24 Finally, issuer recovery should reduce the need for criminal sanctions by freeing outside directors to do the right thing. 4 The criminalization of controversies that traditionally have been seen as matters of corporate governance and fiduciary duty is due at least in part to the failure of boards of directors to monitor management with any real enthusiasm. 24 But the danger of triggering a SFCA-with the potential for costs far in excess of any benefit to the stockholders-impedes vigorous action by the board of directors. 246 If we eliminate this obstacle to effective monitoring by the board of directors, it may not be necessary to prosecute cases that do not involve a truly criminal enterprise. 
VII. MAKING IT HAPPEN
By recasting stock-drop actions as derivative actions, the courts could in one stroke eliminate the glaring market inefficiency of circular recovery, lower the cost of capital for issuers, emphasize individual responsibility, induce boards of directors and gatekeepers to become more vigilant, and reduce the need for criminal prosecution. 24 What a deal. But aside from indications that the Supreme Court might welcome it, what will cause the courts to make such a radical change?
Legal scholars seem to agree that it is up to the courts to fix the problem.
249
Although the courts might be reluctant to effect such a change, the SEC could presumably nudge them in right direction by using its broad power to grant exemptions under federal securities law. 5 For example, the SEC might exempt issuers from class actions except in cases in which they have dealt in their own stock."' One might object that it is somehow inappropriate to focus here on the procedural form of the action."
2 In other words, whether one has a cause of action should not depend on the procedural device one chooses to pursue it.
2 "' The easy answer is that Congress did exactly that in PSLRA and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) of 1998 by establishing special rules for securities fraud actions that take the form of class actions. 254 Looking back, that seems like an extraordinary thing to do. On the other hand, it indicates that lawmakers somehow intuited the problem of circularity.
2 5 Moreover, it is quite clear that the courts have considerable discretion in the management of class actions because they affect the rights of absent parties. 6 That is the point of the certification requirement. 257 260 Some scholars have expressed doubt that the courts will be willing to make the necessary changes in the law. ' I am more optimistic that the courts will do the right thing, particularly if plaintiff attorneys realize that there is a living to be made from prosecuting derivative actions. 62 As I argue elsewhere, in addition to an action based on unjust enrichment, there are other elements of damages arising from securities fraud (such as reputational harm to the corporation) that a derivative plaintiff might pursue. 263 Moreover, there is a fundamental conflict between the plaintiff class and the plaintiff corporation in a derivative action. 264 A zealous derivative plaintiff should argue that the recovery for unjust enrichment and reputational harm should go to the corporation and not to the class. 265 Moreover, the derivative plaintiff as a representative of the corporation should argue that the class action should be dismissed in order to prevent dissipation of corporate assets and derivative harm to the stockholders (including both buyers and non-trading holders).
66 When the issue is so joined, the courts may have no choice but to fish or cut bait. It may not be possible to avoid making a decision between the mutually exclusive alternatives of class action and derivative action. 267 Although it has become increasingly common for derivative actions to be filed along side SFCAs, no court has yet been forced to choose between the two as arguably it should.
268
Some scholars have also suggested that corporations or their stockholders may be able to fix things by means of charter or bylaw amendments that govern stockholder actions.
2 69 Adam Pritchard has suggested that a corporation could specify that the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance does not apply to it. 27° A more straightforward approach would be a provision to the effect that in order to recover from the corporation in any action based on a purchase or sale of the company's stock-or other securities for that matter-the plaintiff must prove actual reliance.
27 " ' As Pritchard recognizes, it might be argued that this limitation on liability constitutes an impermissible waiver of compliance under section 29 of the 1934 Act.
2 72 His response is that waiver of the presumption of reliance does not constitute a waiver of compliance.
273 I might argue further that neither does the waiver of an implied right of action constitute a waiver of compliance with the act or rules thereunder. 274 So perhaps a corporation could even adopt a rule that provides that it shall not be liable to any stockholder except in a situation in which the corporation itself has traded in its own securities. 275 Specifically, the corporation may be liable to buyers only if the corporation has sold securities and may be liable to sellers only if the corporation has bought securities. 276 As Pritchard also notes, the Supreme Court has addressed the waiver issue in only one setting-in connection with mandatory arbitration clauses-and there only in connection with one-on-one broker-customer disputes and broker-employee disputes-both of which tend to be small potatoes as compared to SFCAs that are imbued with public interest. 277 Moreover, the waiver in question in such cases is not one that relates to compliance with substantive provisions of the 1934 Act but rather the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts in connection with cases arising thereunder. 278 On the other hand, the fact that the Court has signed off on the arbitration of disputes arising under the 1934 Act suggests that the Court might well approve a rule governing procedural aspects of securities litigation.
279
For example, the corporation might adopt a rule providing that any SFCA filed against the corporation be deemed to be an action on behalf of the corporation-a derivative action-to recover any amount that may have been misappropriated from the corporation or any damage that may have been done to the corporation except to the extent that the corporation itself is alleged to have sold stock to or bought stock from the plaintiff class.
28
Arguably this provision is no waiver at all because it is consistent with virtually all applicable state and federal law. "' In other words, such a provision could be seen as a clarification of how the law should be applied in a situation in which the law itself is quite confused.
2 2 First, state law generally favors derivative actions over class actions. 28 3 That is, to the extent that an injury may be characterized as derivative it should be so characterized because recovery redounds to the benefit of the stockholders pro rata."' And Congress expressly preserved derivative actions when it enacted SLUSA in 1998.285 Second, although federal law now provides for an individual remedy for insider trading, it also recognizes that the misappropriation theory is based on a duty that runs to the corporation"' To be sure, the corpora- plaintiff alleges an injury that affects the shareholder's pro rata interests, then the claim should be a derivative action, and that, although this seems straightforward, "differentiation of direct from derivative claims can be elusive"). But when it comes to procedure, and indeed the content of the FRCP, it is the responsibility of the courts to make the law. 9 ' And under the 1934 Act, the remedy for short-swing trading-a form of insider trading-is that the culprit must give up his gain (or loss avoided) to the issuer. 292 Indeed, the statute specifically states that the action may be prosecuted as a derivative action if the issuer fails to sue. 293 On the other side of the ledger there is the well-established institution of SFCAs as recognized by PSLRA and SLUSA. 1975) (rejecting a claim by corporation under Florida law, holding that state precedent required "actual damage" to the corporation be alleged, and refusing to extend the fiduciary duty of common law set forth in Diamond to the defendants who benefitted from insider trading, but who were not directors or officers of the corporation); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660-61 (Mass. 1933) (rejecting the plaintiff's common law fraud claim against the directors of a corporation who purchased the plaintiff's stock because the information that the defendants knew was only a speculative theory, there was not a duty to disclose, and the corporation was not harmed from the nondisclosure of the information).
289. 
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only provision that provides for an individual right of action (other than under the 1933 Act) is section 18 of the 1934 Act. 29 That section, which is seldom used, provides for an individual remedy in cases in which an investor can prove reliance on a false statement in a document filed with the SEC.
96
To be sure, waiver of the fraud-on-the-market presumption would preserve the possibility that one or more plaintiffs who could not prove reliance might nonetheless recover from the corporation.
2 9 ' For example, a large investor such as a mutual fund might be able to prove that its analysts relied on specific false statements disseminated by the corporation. One might argue that it is crucial to preserve this possibility in order to avoid waiver. 298 Moreover, one might argue that a derivative action is an inadequate alternative because the cause of action would belong to the corporation and because the corporation would not have standing to sue under federal law because of the Blue Chip Stamps doctrine which limits standing to those who purchase or sell securities. 299 Neither of these considerations outweighs the advantages of derivative actions.
First, to say that a large investor such as a mutual fund might be fooled into making a significant investment has a hollow ring."° It seems much more likely that a well-advised fund would either depend on diversification to protect itself from misinformation in run-of-the-mill trading decisions or do enough research to uncover the truth (or at least doubts about issuer representations) when contemplating a major position. "' Moreover, it seems likely that many significant investments will involve purchase of securities directly from the corporation or a major stockholder, in which case the buyer will likely have an action against the seller if any relief is appropriate. 296. Id. Ironically, it is a common practice at the SEC to exempt many documents from this provision by deeming them not to be filed documents. See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 915 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that the corporation's annual report which allegedly contained false or misleading financial information was not considered a filed document for section 18 liability); see also In re Digi Int'l, Inc., Sec. Litig., 6 F. Supp Second, the possibility that Blue Chip Stamps would preclude a corporation from suing insiders in federal court is of little moment. Again, the corporation can always sue in state court. Moreover, it is not clear that the rule of Blue Chip Stamps applies in this setting. The rule is designed to limit the exposure of issuers to actions by holders.
3 "' To say that this judge-made limitation on a judge-made cause of action precludes an issuer from enforcing federal securities law against its own insiders would be quite extraordinary, particularly in light of section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, which expressly provides for such an action in connection with shortswing trading.1 4 So it is not at all clear that the courts would apply the rule to a corporate plaintiff seeking to sue in federal court. ("Conduct itself can be deceptive, as respondents concede."). Still, in emphasizing that there can be no liability under federal law without deception and that O'Hagan could have escaped prosecution simply by disclosing that he intended to trade on inside information, the Court sought to distinguish federal law from the state law of fiduciary duty, perhaps because the Court was concerned that otherwise federal law would simply afford an alternative remedy that might supplant state law or that it might be argued that federal law was unnecessary in this context. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654-55. The distinction is that under state law, disclosure would not cure such a breach of the duty of loyalty. See id. Either way the statement in O'Hagan that there must be actual deception based on a fiduciary duty (and presumably a breach thereof) is ultimately dictum. See id. at 654. The Court has never been faced with a case in which an insider announced his intent to trade on inside information. To be sure, Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) comes close. But the transaction there-a short form merger-was one that was expressly authorized by state law and one that would have been actionable if there had been any remedy available under state law at the time. Id. at 478.
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CONCLUSION
Stoneridge is hardly a landmark decision in the evolution of federal securities law or even private securities litigation thereunder. But it does suggest an opportunity for reform. The best hope is that plaintiff attorneys will see the promise of derivative actions as an effective alternative to class actions and will come to oppose class certification as contrary to the interests of the corporation and the non-trading stockholders that usually constitute a majority of the affected investors. Another approach is to focus on the true meaning of scienter and deceit. Neither can exist in the absence of gain. So unless the corporation somehow gains from fraud, the fraud is damnum absque iniuria-damage without a wrongful act. A fortiori, there is no causation. But when insiders use the opportunity for gain, they should be answerable individually. Finally, this rearrangement of the remedial scheme has the added and significant benefit of focusing deterrence where it matters and in proportion to the true harm involved.
